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This paper challenges the growing consensus in the literature (Stone, 2001, 2005) that 
medieval manorial managers were price responsive in their production decisions. 
Using prices of and acreages planted with wheat, barley, and oats on manors held by 
the bishop of Winchester from 1325-70, I estimate price elasticities of supply for each 
grain in aggregate and on each particular manor. Aggregate price elasticities of supply 
for wheat, barley and oats were rarely statistically significant and when significant 
were very low compared with elasticities estimated for developing and developed 
countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The low levels of agricultural 
supply response in fourteenth-century England suggest that commercialisation was 
not as dominant in the medieval economy as has been argued. Thus, structural 
changes in the economy such as the leasing of demesnes, the growth of wage labour, 
and the end of villeinage may have been more important in driving long-run 
economic change after the Black Death than price fluctuations. Likewise, a shift from 
low price responsiveness to higher price responsiveness could have been an important 
part of the capitalist transformation of agriculture in the early modern period. 
 
  
                                                
1 I would like to thank Bob Allen, Bruce Campbell, Rui Esteves, and two anonymous referees for 
useful advice on a number of occasions. In addition, I would like to thank seminar participants at 
Nuffield College, Oxford, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and the LSE. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
 1 
Over the past thirty years, medieval economic historians have challenged the 
opinions of earlier scholars that the medieval economy was a ‘natural economy’ 
devoid of significant money relations and commerce, arguing that commercialization 
played a strong role in medieval economic development. Britnell used new sources 
and methodologies to measure the proliferation of markets in England.2 Campbell et 
al. studied how the counties surrounding London developed a unique economic 
structure in order to provide for the demand for agricultural commodities in the 
capital.3 Masschaele and Kowaleski have described inland and overseas trade in their 
studies of markets and the marketing of goods in the late Middle Ages.4 Clark, 
Galloway, and Bateman have argued that markets were relatively well integrated in 
late medieval England.5 Briggs has described credit relations in medieval English 
villages.6 Stone and Dodds have emphasized the remarkable flexibility and price 
responsiveness of seigniorial and peasant agriculture.7 The growing consensus in 
medieval English history is that the late medieval period was characterized by well-
developed commercial processes.8 
However, there is reason to be suspicious of overly rosy views of the extent of 
commercialisation in medieval England. Britnell’s more limited, localised 
interpretation of markets and trade and Kanzaka’s findings that villain rents were 
mainly determined by custom rather than economic factors confirm this suspicion.9 
Essentially, the existence of money, markets, and trade does not mean that these 
forces were strongly or actively influencing economic development. Thus, this paper 
will test the degree of commercialisation in the medieval economy by measuring price 
responsiveness, or agricultural supply response, in seigniorial agriculture. 
Development economists first developed methodologies for measuring price 
responsiveness in the late 1950s with Nerlove’s seminal study of agricultural supply 
response.10 Thus, price elasticities of supply have been estimated for a wide range of 
crops in many countries, including several historical calculations of elasticities in the 
late nineteenth century.11 Generally, development economists have found positive 
price elasticities of supply for agriculture, suggesting that even in developing 
economies, farmers were price responsive. The elasticities for peasant production 
were lower than the elasticities for industrial farming, but they suggested that the 
picture of the risk-averse, non-profit maximizing peasant was largely a myth.12  
                                                
2 Britnell, ‘Proliferation’, 209-21. 
3 Campbell et al., Medieval Capital, 171-83. 
4 Masschaele, Peasants; Kowaleski, Local Markets. 
5 Clark, ‘Markets’; Bateman, ‘Evolution’; Galloway, ‘One Market’. 
6 Briggs, Credit, 214-23. 
7 Stone, Decision-Making; Dodds, Peasants. 
8 Bailey, ‘Historiographical Essay’, 304-5. 
9 Britnell, ‘Urban’, 1-9; Kanzaka, ‘Villein’, 617. 
10 Nerlove, Dynamics; Askari and Cummings, ‘Estimating’, 257. 
11 Askari and Cummings, Agricultural; Schuh and Brandão, ‘Theory’, 660-65. 
12 Rao, ‘Agricultural Supply Response’, 5-6. 
 2 
Medieval economic historians have also both implicitly and explicitly studied 
price responsiveness of manorial managers, reeves, with two schools of thought 
emerging. The older generation of medieval economic historians who mostly came 
before the commercialisation turn in the literature argued that reeves were unlikely to 
be profit-maximizers because strong institutional structures misaligned their 
incentives: reeves were not given a share of manorial profits, their responsibilities 
were onerous, and they were held personally liable for any losses during their 
tenure.13 Likewise, the manorial account system developed by the lords and their 
representatives to monitor the reeves did not measure manorial profits but instead 
sought to protect the lord from fraud at the local level.14 Biddick was the first to 
statistically test price responsiveness on nine manors held by the bishop of 
Winchester from 1209-37, and her findings generally confirmed the older 
generation’s intuitions. Acreages planted with a particular crop were more highly 
correlated with the percentage of the harvest consumed by the bishop than with 
prices. Thus, price variations had a relatively low impact on reeves’ planting 
decisions.15 
However, in the last decade several historians have begun to refute this earlier 
consensus, using evidence of price responsiveness to argue for an expanded role of 
commercialization in medieval economic development. Dodds reconstructed peasant 
production from the tithe receipts of Durham Cathedral Priory and argued that 
peasants were price responsive in their production decisions because, for instance, the 
percentage of wheat out of the total tithe output was correlated with lagged wheat 
prices.16 In addition, Stone has pieced together an extremely detailed picture of the 
managerial decision-making on the fenland manor of Wisbech Barton, arguing that 
reeves could be exceptionally good managers and were price responsive in the way 
they planted their fields. Stone extended this argument to a number of manors across 
Southern England, suggesting that good management and with it, price 
responsiveness, were widespread in seigniorial agriculture.17 
Biddick, Stone and Dodds’s research is very interesting and fruitful, but it 
raises concerns for several reasons. First, Stone only looked at a small sample of 
manors, which were not representative of the country or seigniorial agriculture as a 
whole. Second, Stone found that all of the manors had elements of price 
responsiveness, but they were all responsive in different ways. Some reeves were 
responsive in their planting decisions, for instance at Hambledon, Hinderclay, and 
Hanford manors, but others were responsive in the way they managed livestock, for 
instance pigs on Cuxham manor and sheep on Kinsbourne manor.18 These results 
highlight good managerial practices in different aspects of manorial production, but 
they do not allow historians to understand the important economic question of 
whether price elasticities of supply for each particular good produced were 
                                                
13 Stern, Hertfordshire, 64-6; Robo, Farnham, 26-7; Drew, ‘Manorial’, 12-3; Harvey, Medieval, 63-74; 
Bailey, Manor, 31, 99. 
14 Postles, ‘Perception’, 23; Drew, ‘Manorial’, 16; Harvey, Manorial, 30-31. 
15 Biddick, ‘Agrarian Productivity’, 109-12. 
16 Dodds, Peasants, 161. 
17 Stone, Decision-Making, 206-12. 
18 Stone, ‘Medieval’, 619-23; Stone, Decision-Making, 189-212. 
 3 
significantly different than zero in aggregate: i.e. was the price response in grain and 
livestock production substantial on the majority of manors across the country? 
Finally, neither Stone, Biddick, nor Dodds tested price responsiveness in a specific 
theoretical framework with robust econometric techniques. The correlations they cite 
as proof of price responsiveness are only a first step, which can be improved by 
estimating price elasticities of supply for the various crops.  
This paper will thus expand upon existing work by testing whether reeves on 
the manors held by the Bishop of Winchester between 1325 and 1370 responded to 
annual price fluctuations in the way that they planted their fields. This may seem a 
rather narrow view of commercialisation, but agricultural price responsiveness was 
crucially important for economic development and growth. If producers were not 
price responsive, then planting decisions were on average determined by the crop 
rotations in practice and other non-market factors, not by prices or input costs. This 
would call into question producers’ ability to adopt innovative technology or increase 
productivity in the absence of institutional or structural changes in the economy and 
would, therefore, weaken the influence of commercialization in the economy. 
However, if agricultural producers responded to prices or input costs in an attempt to 
maximize profit, then changes in prices and wages could have a significant influence 
on the development of agriculture and the medieval economy as a whole.19 
 
I 
The fourteenth century was a period of economic and social upheaval. There 
was a massive famine (1315-17) in which perhaps ten to fifteen per cent of the 
population of England died and a cattle plague beginning in 1319, which destroyed 
approximately half of the cattle population.20 Later in the study period, the Black 
Death (1348-50) killed off at least 30 per cent of the population of England, and this 
number was only increased with recurrences of the plague in the 1361, 1369 and 
1375.21 The period was also punctuated by periods of exceptionally bad weather.22 
Conditions were quite different before and after the Black Death. In 1325, when this 
study begins, the economy was still recovering from the Great Famine and the cattle 
murrain, but although the landlords were squeezed by deflation and low prices in the 
1330s, the seigniorial system continued as normal.23 Following the Black Death, 
labour shortages forced wages up and landlords had a harder time maintaining the 
work force on their manors. This eventually threatened the profitability of the direct 
management of estates leading lords to lease out their manors at the end of the 
fourteenth and in the fifteenth centuries.24 However, the twenty years or so following 
the Black Death saw a reinforcement of the manorial system sometimes called the 
                                                
19 Yotopoulos and Nugent, Economics, 135-7; Schuh and Brandão, ‘Theory’, 655-8. 
20 Campbell, ‘Nature’, 9-10; Newfield, ‘Cattle’, 171-80; Slavin, ‘Great Bovine Pestilence’, pp. 1241-
43. 
21 Campbell, English, 6-7; Hatcher, Plague, 21-6; Keen, English, 27-9. 
22 Campbell, ‘Nature’; Campbell, ‘Grain’. 
23 Campbell, English, 4-7. 
24 Campbell, English, 6-10; Hare, ‘Bishop’, 209-11. 
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‘Indian summer of demesne farming’ as lords were able to maintain direct 
management without major interruptions.25 
The shocks of the fourteenth century greatly affected the economic system and 
surely affected the production decisions that reeves and estate managers were making 
at the local and estate level respectively.26 However, rather than investigating the 
influence of these shocks, this paper seeks to understand whether reeves considered 
annual price variation when making their production decisions. Thus, it tests the more 
incremental argument of the commercialization model that individuals’ responses to 
market forces drove economic development. Therefore, although the years studied 
here cover periods of economic turmoil, they can still serve to test whether reeves 
were price responsive in their production decisions. 27 
The manorial accounts which form the primary source on medieval farming 
for this paper were an annual account through which the lord’s representative, the 
steward, scrutinized how each of the lord’s manors was managed. These accounts 
were enrolled in the Winchester Pipe Rolls for a majority of the manors held by the 
Bishop of Winchester and contain a wealth of information about the seigniorial 
agricultural economy, including crop yields, acreages sown with various crops, seed 
rates, grain prices, and piece wages for a large number of manors across the southern 
and southwestern counties of England.28 From these accounts, we can then construct a 
detailed picture of how manorial management worked. 
The bishop of Winchester’s steward managed all of his estates with bailiffs 
usually in charge of a couple of manors.29 Although there is evidence that these 
officials had control over the bishop’s flocks of sheep, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the central authorities interfered in annual planting decisions on 
individual manors.30 Therefore, planting decisions, along with all other day-to-day 
management of the demesne, the lord’s land on each manor, were left to the reeve. 
Reeves were typically elected from the ranks of local customary tenants. 
Contemporary treatises on manorial management suggest that the reeve’s position 
should have passed to a different person every year unless the reeve had ‘proved very 
capable, just in his actions, and well able to further the lord’s interests’.31 In practice, 
however, the reeve’s position often fell to those who had proven their ability to 
manage the demesne well, and these individuals stayed in post for a number of 
years.32  
                                                
25 Bridbury, ‘Black Death’, 584; Hatcher, ‘England’, 6; Stone, Decision-Making, 82-4. 
26 Campbell, English, 375-6; Titow, English, 49; Campbell, ‘Grain’, 156-161. 
27 Ó Gráda, Famine, 143-55. 
28 Titow, English, 24-9; Farmer, ‘Prices’, (1988), 715-16; Harvey, Manorial, 25-37. 
29 Page, ‘William Wykeham’, 105; Page, Medieval Bishops, 8-11; Thornton, ‘Determinants’, 201-2. 
30 Thornton, ‘Efficiency’, 32, 42-4; Hare, ‘Bishop’, 205; Page, ‘Technology’, 140-3; One example of 
interference was that the sub-manors of Taunton were originally managed centrally from Taunton 
Castle, but in the late thirteenth century, the manors were reorganized to be managed at the local 
level. Thornton, ‘Level’, 113-5. 
31 Oschinsky, Walter, p. 279. 
32 The Merton College manor of Cuxham had two reeves in the pre-Black Death period (1288-1349), 
one serving c. 21 years and the other serving c. 38 years. The average length of time spent could 
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Reeves did have some incentives to be price responsive. In return for their 
services, they were exempt from customary manorial fees and labour obligations and 
received some food and other small bonuses at harvest time.33 Reeves were also 
occasionally allowed to keep production above a certain level; for instance, St. 
Swithun’s Priory allowed reeves to keep production above 60 piglets, 28 goslings, 60 
chickens, and 300 eggs, giving reeves on their manors some incentives to produce 
above this level to gain profit themselves.34 Finally, reeves could use their authority to 
gain influence in the community and to embezzle goods or money from the lord.35 
Reeves also continued to farm their own plot while managing the demesne and thus, 
had no subsistence related risk aversion often attributed to peasants when making 
decisions about demesne land.36 Thus, reeves had some incentives to consider prices 
when making production decisions, though these incentives likely changed over time 
based on the relative burden of manorial obligations and the time required to manage 
the demesne. 
However, there were also clear limitations to the reeve’s incentives and 
production flexibility. Although reeves received remuneration for their services, the 
job was very onerous, and it is not clear that the exemptions reeves received for 
taking on the position would equal or exceed the losses they likely faced from lost 
labour and time on their own plots; there are several known cases where customary 
tenants paid a substantial fee to avoid serving as the reeve.37 In addition, reeves were 
held personally responsible for any losses, real or perceived, that came up in the audit, 
but they received no extra bonuses if they managed the manor efficiently. In fact, the 
definition of ‘efficient’ management appears to have been very different than the 
modern profit-maximizer’s calculation. The main purpose of manorial accounts was 
not to measure profit or loss (profit calculations varied across estates and were not 
even calculated for some estates) but instead to ensure that the lord was not being 
defrauded by the local officials.38 Thus, reeves’ performance was not judged on their 
ability to measure opportunity cost and take prudent decisions in response to market 
forces. 
In addition, there was some path dependency in the production strategies that 
would have limited the reeves’ ability to adjust the acreage planted on a year-to-year 
basis. Basic crop rotation and fallowing was necessary to maintain the nutrient 
content of the soil. In its simplest form, this rotation consisted of three fields: one 
sown with a winter crop such as wheat, one sown with spring crops such as barley 
and oats, and one left fallow to regain some of its nutrients. Clearly, in this system 
reeves could not switch all of their production to wheat in response to climbing wheat 
                                                                                                                                      
be much lower, though, with reeves at Kinsbourne manor from 1293-1397 serving an average of 3 
years. Harvey, Medieval, 64; Stern, Hertfordshire, 65; Stone, Decision-Making; Bailey, Manor, 
99. 
33 Bailey, Manor, 98-9; Harvey, Medieval, 69-71; Drew, ‘Manorial’, 27-9. 
34 Drew, ‘Manorial’, 28. 
35 Harvey, Medieval, 69-71; Drew, ‘Manorial’, 27-9. 
36 Page, Medieval Bishops, 8-11, 22; Page, ‘William Wykeham’, 106-7; Titow, Winchester, 2-3; Stone, 
Decision-Making, 169-70; Thornton, ‘Determinants’, 186, 202. 
37 Drew, ‘Manorial’, 27; Bailey, 31, 98-9; Harvey, Medieval, 65-6. 
38 Stern, Hertforshire, 64-6; Harvey, Manorial, 28-9; Drew, ‘Manorial’, 16; Bailey, Manor, 98-9. 
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prices.39 Likewise, reeves’ flexibility was limited by their requirement to provide for 
the consumption of the lord’s household. This might mean providing lambs for meat, 
wheat for bread, or oats as fodder for the lord’s horses.40 Finally, reeves may have 
avoided major investment that could not be recuperated quickly in order to avoid 
falling into arrears. This would be especially true of large capital outlays, though it 
makes less sense for grain planting decisions since the grain was normally sold within 
a year of the harvest.41 
Having discussed the responsibilities of reeves, we can move on to discuss the 
specific context of the Winchester estates. Unfortunately, the Winchester manors 
were not representative of seigniorial agriculture across England. Large ecclesiastical 
manors made up a minority of seigniorial land, and seigniorial land itself was dwarfed 
by the peasant agricultural sector.42 Even for ecclesiastical manors, the Winchester 
manors were larger than average, both in terms of the grand scale of the estate as a 
whole and individual manors. The Winchester estate was also held in direct 
management for longer than almost any other estate whose records survive and relied 
more heavily on labour obligations than other estates, which had to hire labour.43 The 
large size of the Winchester estates also meant that from a very early date they sold 
larger amounts of their produce than other seigniorial estates: 66 per cent of the wheat 
harvest was sold between 1209 and 1237 on Biddick’s nine Winchester estates, and 
64 per cent of the net crop was sold circa 1300 on thirteen of the bishop’s manors 
near London.44 In terms of cropping patterns, many of the manors followed three-
course rotations or sowed almost exclusively wheat, barley and oats. This pattern was 
fairly common throughout Southern England with 53.3 per cent of demesnes in 
Campbell’s demesne dataset falling into these production types.45 However, the 
Winchester manors along the Thames and in the Chilterns and Cotswolds sowed large 
amounts of mixed grains and had a ready market for their produce in London, making 
them similar in some ways to the productive and commercialized manors of East 
Anglia and Kent.46 Despite this diversity, the composition of cropping and husbandry 
types does not follow the national pattern. More intensive cropping and mixed-
farming types are underrepresented in the sample.47 
The ‘uniqueness’ of the Winchester estates makes it difficult to extend all 
findings from the Winchester manors to a broader context of fourteenth-century 
England.48 However, it is possible to speculate about how this uniqueness would have 
affected their relative price responsiveness. The size and market orientation of the 
manors would suggest that the Winchester estates were more likely to be price 
                                                
39 Titow, English, 19-21; Campbell, English, 10-16; Thornton, ‘Determinants’, 184-7. 
40 Biddick, ‘Agrarian Productivity’, 104; Harvey, Medieval, 75-9; Campbell, English, 55-6. 
41 Farmer, ‘Marketing’, 358-63. 
42 Campbell, English, 60; Dodds, ‘Demesne’, 124; Campbell, ‘Unique’, 22-4. 
43 Campbell, ‘Unique’, 26-7; Farmer, ‘Famuli’, 211. 
44 Biddick, ‘Agrarian Productivity’, 106; Campbell, ‘Measuring’, 158-60; Campbell, ‘Unique’, 29. 
45 Campbell, English, 277. 
46 Titow, Winchester, 23, 73-81. 
47 Campbell, English, 277.  
48 Campbell, ‘Unique’, 39-43. 
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responsive because there would be greater gains from price responsiveness with 
greater output marketed. The bishopric’s reliance on forced labour throughout the 
fourteenth century may have made them less responsive to changes in prices relative 
to wages, but this should not have affected the incentives of reeves to respond to 
prices or relative prices as described below. On the other hand, the conservative and 
extensive crop rotations may have limited reeves flexibility in adjusting their 
cropping patterns more than the intensive systems predominant in East Anglia, 
lowering their ability to be price responsive. On balance, then, there were factors that 
would have made the Winchester estates more and less price responsive than the 
average manor. It would be ideal to conduct a similar study on a wider range of 
manors, but the Winchester manors can provide a useful starting point for robustly 
measuring agricultural supply response in fourteenth-century England. 
I did not collect the data used for this dataset from the original documents, 
instead drawing extensively on the notes of D. L. Farmer held in the archives at the 
University of Saskatchewan and the notes of Jan Titow held in the Hampshire Record 
Office.49 The paper is based upon two datasets of manors held by the bishop of 
Winchester: a panel dataset of 31 manors from 1325 to 1348 and a panel dataset of 49 
manors (including the initial 31) from 1349-70. When estimated separately, the panels 
are strongly balanced but do have some missing data because the manorial accounts 
were damaged or have not survived. This paper relies upon two main aspects of the 
accounts: the acreage planted with wheat, barley, and oats; and the respective prices 
of these grains. As mentioned above, other grains such as fodder crops and mixed 
grains were also planted on the Winchester estates, and on a few manors they 
dominated the arable land. However, over the entire Winchester estate fodder crops 
and mixed grains only made up an average of 14.08 per cent of arable land planted 
each year on the 31-manor sample from 1325-70.50 Considering the low percentages 
of arable land sown with mixed grains and the fact that leguminous fodder crops were 
rarely marketed, it seems reasonable to focus on wheat, barley and oats in this 
paper.51 Titow and Farmer recorded the acreage of wheat, barley and oats sown on 
each of the Winchester manors.52  The average acreage in seed (1349-70) ranged from 
43 acres on Bitterne manor in southern Hampshire to 489 acres on East Mean manor 
also is southern Hampshire with a median across all manors of 134 acres. In order to 
compare acreages sown across manors in the regressions, it was necessary to 
standardize the acreages: the acreage of each crop sown in a given year was divided 
by the average acreage of that crop sown on the manor over the period or sub-period 
studied. 
Farmer also recorded many local and regional price series along with a 
national price series for wheat, barley, and oats. Unfortunately, manor-specific wheat 
prices were not available for all years, so manor specific prices were interpolated with 
Farmer’s regional price series. The interpolated prices made up less than 10 per cent 
of the data. Barley and oats prices were either not available on a manor specific level 
                                                
49 University of Saskatchewan Archives, The Papers of David Farmer, Series III, Boxes 11, 12, and 14; 
Hampshire Record Office, Titow Research Papers, 97M97/B1, 97M97/B5. 
50 Corroborated by Titow, English, 42; Hare, ‘Bishop’, 194-6, 202. 
51 Campbell, ‘Measuring’, 157. 
52 University of Saskatchewan Archives, The Papers of David Farmer, Series III, Box 10, Folder 1, 
parts 1-4. 
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or had too many missing values to be used at the manor level. Therefore, Farmer’s 
regional price series, the arithmetic mean of the prices on manors in each region, were 
used in the regressions. These regional series were interpolated using Farmer’s 
national series.53 As a robustness check, the regional wheat price series was also used 
in the regressions, but there was no change in the results. Farmer’s national wage 
series was not available in disaggregated form among the scanned copies of his notes, 
so the national reaping wage series was used in the regressions.54 
II 
Previous studies of price responsiveness in medieval England solely used 
correlation coefficients to measure whether the acreage sown with a particular grain 
varied in relation to the price. Pearson correlations measure whether there is a 
relationship between two variables. However, they cannot reveal the causality 
between the two variables, and they do not measure the size of the response, i.e. the 
amount of extra land planted when the price of a certain grain increases. 
In order to determine causality, one must form a theoretical model that links 
the prices and supply. Dodds, Stone, and Biddick had implicit models even though 
they did not elaborate them in detail. Stone argued that the acreage planted with a 
particular grain at the beginning of the year was determined (in part) by the price of 
the grain throughout the same year.55 Thus, he assumes that reeves were able to 
predict the wheat price in the twelve months after they planted their wheat crop in the 
late autumn and adjusted the acreage sown with wheat accordingly. This seems a 
rather heroic assertion given that prices fluctuated substantially throughout the year 
and reeves could not have been privy to all of the information needed to perfectly 
predict the price in the year after they planted their crops.56 Biddick and Dodds, on 
the other hand, follow the traditional agricultural supply response literature in arguing 
that acreage decisions made at the beginning of the harvest year were based on 
reeve’s understanding of past prices. Thus, Dodds uses an average of prices in the 
previous two years and Biddick uses a number of lagged prices before settling on the 
price in the previous year.57  
However, even with an implicit theoretical model, correlations between prices 
and acreages planted are not robust enough to measure price responsiveness because 
they do not measure the size of the effect of one variable on the other. For example, 
imagine a hypothetical manor where the reeve sows one hundred acres with wheat on 
average, and the average wheat price is 8 shillings/quarter. Now suppose the reeve 
increases or decreases the acreage sown by one acre in the current year for every two 
shillings/quarter change in the wheat price in the previous year: thus, the reeve plants 
102 acres of wheat when the wheat price was 12 shillings/quarter in the previous year 
                                                
53 Farmer, ‘Prices’, (1991), 501-25; Farmer, ‘Prices’, (1988), 787-817; University of Saskatchewan 
Archives, The Papers of David Farmer, Series III: Box 10, Folder 30; Box 12, Folder 50; Box 14, 
Folders 1, 2, and 5. 
54 Farmer, ‘Prices’, (1991), 501-25. 
55 Stone, Decision-Making, 206-12; Stone, ‘Medieval’, 619-23. 
56 McCloskey and Nash, ‘Corn’, 177-8. 
57 Biddick, ‘Agrarian Productivity’, 106-9; Dodds, Peasants, 161. 
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and 98 acres of wheat when the wheat price was 4 shillings/quarter in the previous 
year. A Pearson correlation coefficient would show a strong relationship between the 
acreage planted with wheat and the wheat price in the previous year, but this does not 
mean that the price had any influence on overall supply. Assuming constant yields, 
the total output would only increase by 2 per cent even though the price increased by 
50 per cent. This scenario would yield a very low price elasticity of supply of 0.034. 
Thus, in order to measure the size of the influence of prices on acreage 
planted, it is necessary to use regression analysis. In order to compare price 
responsiveness across manors, elasticities of supply must be estimated. A price 
elasticity of supply is simply the percentage change in output that is caused by a one 
per cent increase in the price. Generally, elasticities greater than or equal to one are 
considered to be elastic or highly responsive to prices because a one percentage 
increase in the price leads to a larger than one per cent increase in the supply. 
Elasticities less than one are considered inelastic or not particularly responsive to 
prices. However, agricultural price elasticities of supply are rarely as high as 1 
because farmers in all time periods had less flexibility to adjust their output than firms 
in other sectors of the economy. Therefore, later in the paper the medieval price 
elasticities estimated will be compared with price elasticities of supply for agricultural 
production in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to gauge whether medieval price 
elasticities of supply were low relative to others. 
This paper employs a partial adjustment model to estimate price elasticities of 
supply. The exact formulation of the model along with the methods of estimation are 
provided in Appendix A for those apt in modelling and econometric techniques. Put 
simply, the partial adjustment model assumes that there is an equilibrium or desired 
acreage that farmers will want to plant with a certain crop based on expected prices. 
However, farmers may not be able to immediately adjust their production to the 
equilibrium level and the model accounts for this by allowing the equilibrium level to 
be reached over a period longer than one year. 
The reeve’s expected price is held to be the price of each grain in the previous 
year.58 This may seem an unrealistic assumption, but the correlation between the 
wheat price in the current year and previous year is higher than the correlation 
between the wheat prices in the current year and any other lags and moving averages 
of lagged prices. Thus, the price in the previous year may be the best indicator of 
price fluctuations in the subsequent year anyway. As Askari and Cummings have 
argued, it is necessary to represent the price in different ways in the model in order to 
capture the various incentives that farmers faced.59 Three price measures were used in 
the regressions in order to understand more precisely what triggered reeves to shift 
their production: the price of each grain, the relative cost of a grain and its closest 
substitute, and the labour input costs measured as the price of the grain divided by the 
reaping wage. As mentioned above, manor specific wheat prices were available for all 
manors, but regional prices were used for barley and oats in the regressions. Reaping 
                                                
58 Unfortunately, it is not possible to use a more complex notion of expected prices in the partial 
adjustment model without controls that were unavailable for the medieval period. See note 95 in 
the appendix. 
59 Askari and Cummings, ‘Estimating’, 259. 
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wages were highly correlated with ploughing, mowing, and threshing wages, and 
therefore can be used as a proxy for all labour input costs.60 
The main indicator produced by the partial adjustment model is the short-run 
price elasticity of supply. The short-run price elasticity of supply is the percentage 
change in acreage caused by a one per cent increase in the price in one year. There are 
three possible interpretations of the short-run price elasticity. If the short-run elasticity 
is statistically significant and positive, then reeves planted larger acreages with a crop 
when its price was higher and, therefore, attempted to maximize profit from that crop. 
If the short-run price elasticity of supply is negative, then reeves planted larger 
acreages with a crop when its expected price was low. Finally, if the short-run price 
elasticity of supply is not significantly different than zero, then reeves did not respond 
to prices in their planting decisions.61 
The model was estimated first for the panels of 31 and 49 manors for the 
periods 1325-48, 1349-70, and 1325-70. These panel estimators produce an aggregate 
measure of price responsiveness on the Winchester estate. In addition, price 
elasticities of supply were estimated for each manor as a time series for the 49 manors 
for which data exist from 1349-70 in order to understand what factors influenced 
supply responsiveness on different manors across the estate. 
 
III 
The aggregate price elasticities of supply estimated using the entire 
Winchester panel dataset suggest a pessimistic interpretation of price responsiveness 
in medieval England. Price elasticities of supply for wheat were either not statistically 
significant or were negative across all time periods (Table 1). Barley price elasticities 
varied across time periods from negative elasticities for the period before the Black 
Death to positive, yet small elasticities after the Black Death. This change may reflect 
reeves’ response to growing demand for barley after the Black Death. Oats elasticities 
of supply were positive and significant before the Black Death but became 
insignificant after the Black Death. These positive elasticities for oats are surprising 
considering that oats were marketed less than barley or wheat. Perhaps the demand 
for oats as food before the Black Death and the greater flexibility of planting in the 
spring field led to some price responsiveness.62 It is also surprising that many of the 
price elasticities for the price relative to the wage were significant, suggesting that the 
Winchester estates were not immune to labour cost pressures despite their large 
supply of coerced labour. In conclusion, aggregate price elasticities of supply for 
wheat were zero, and the price elasticities of supply for barley and oats were very low 
even if they were statistically significant. 
  
                                                
60 Farmer, ‘Prices’, (1991), 501-25. 
61 Yotopoulos and Nugent, Economics, 135-7. 
62 Campbell, English, 245-7. 
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Table 1: Price elasticities of supply for wheat, barley and oats on the Winchester manors 1325-70. 
Price Elasticities 1325-48 1349-70 1325-70 1349-70* 1325-48 1349-70 1325-70 1349-70* 1325-48 1349-70 1325-70 1349-70*
Grain Price -0.018 -0.024* -0.039*** -0.009 -0.040** 0.031* 0.001 0.028 0.092*** -0.022 -0.024 -0.017
Grain Price Relative to Substitute -0.048 -0.049*** -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.052* 0.028 -0.032 0.045* 0.015 -0.039 0.017 -0.032
Grain Price Relative to Labour Costs -0.022 -0.008 -0.014 0.007 -0.037* 0.034** -0.028** 0.035** 0.090*** -0.003 0.042*** -0.002
Wheat Barley Oats
 
Notes: Short-run price elasticities estimated using equation 3 in appendix I for each grain, time period and price type are reported. The fourth starred column (1349-70) 
includes all 49 manors while the unstarred periods only include the smaller panel of 31 manors. Stars denote significance in the following manner: * significant at the 10 per 
cent level, ** significant at the 5 per cent level, *** significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Sources: see text. 
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At the disaggregated level for the 49 manors available from 1349-70, the 
supply response to changes in wheat prices was generally quite low across the 
Winchester manors. Only fourteen manors had significant short-run price elasticities 
of wheat supply in the regressions: five positive elasticities and nine negative 
elasticities (Tables 2 and 3). These price elasticities, estimated in time series 
regressions with first differenced variables, are not directly comparable with the 
aggregate elasticities presented above, so they have not been reported here. Overall, 
ignoring statistical significance, there were 20 manors with positive average price 
elasticities across the three price types (41 per cent). 
Table 2: Summary of time series results for supply response on individual 
manors. 
    
 Wheat Barley Oats 
    
Total Manors 49 42 48 
    
Positive, Significant Elasticities 5 9 5 
    
Negative, Significant Elasticities 9 4 12 
    
Insignficant Elasticities 35 29 31 
    
Mean Short-run Positive, Sig. 
Elasticities 
0.236 0.501 0.424 
    
Min Short-run Positive, Sig. 
Elasticities 
0.148 0.213 0.168 
    
Max Short-run Positive, Sig. 
Elasticities 
0.370 1.096 0.863 
    
Positive Elasticities 20 23 14 
    
Negative Elasticities 29 19 34 
    
Percentage Positive Elasticities 40.82% 54.76% 29.17% 
Sources: see text. 
 
Positive and significant price elasticities of barley supply were much more 
prevalent for the Winchester manors than positive price elasticities of wheat supply: 
nine manors had significant, positive elasticities; four manors had significant, 
negative elasticities; and twenty-nine manors did not significantly adjust planting 
strategies based on the price. Again setting aside statistical significance, of the 42 
Winchester manors where barley was sown, 23 had positive average price elasticities, 
or 55 per cent. The response for barley was therefore different than the response for 
wheat in the period after the Black Death in three key ways: there were more positive 
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and significant price elasticities on individual manors; ignoring statistical 
significance, there were more manors with positive price elasticities; and the 
aggregate elasticities were statistically significant, though low. These differences are 
expected because the acreage of barley could be changed more easily without 
disrupting long-term cropping strategies by decreasing the acreage planted with oats 
in the spring-sown field. Thus, one would expect more responsiveness between the 
spring-sown crops than wheat, which was more often sown in its own field or with 
small amounts of rye and mixed grains. Barley may have also been more responsive 
because increasing demand for barley following the Black Death made it a highly 
marketable crop, perhaps providing incentives for price responsiveness in barley 
planting decisions.63  
The supply response to oats was much more prevalent than expected. Five 
manors had positive and significant short-run price elasticities of supply for oats, and 
twelve manors had significant and negative price elasticities of supply for oats. The 
fact that seventeen manors in total were price responsive in their oats planting is 
puzzling: oats were both heavy and bulky to transport; they were used predominantly 
as a fodder crop, especially following the Black Death; and they were rarely 
marketed.64 Ignoring statistical significance, there were very few manors that had 
positive price elasticities: 14 manors had positive average price elasticities (29 per 
cent) while 34 had negative average price elasticities. 
This strongly negative price response in oats planting decisions after the Black 
Death may be explained as a counterpoint to the positive price response in barley 
planting decisions discussed above. Because all grain prices were highly correlated 
and oats production was constrained within the spring-sown fields, an increase in 
barley sown would require oats sown to diminish in response. This response was not 
statistically significant at the aggregate level, but it could help explain the large 
number of manors with negative price elasticities of oats supply.  
In summary, there were reeves on a number of manors that responded to 
different price variables in determining the acreage sown with wheat, barley, and oats. 
Positive and significant price elasticities were higher and more prevalent for barley 
than for wheat or oats because barley was easily substitutable with oats within the 
spring-sown field and because barley was highly marketable as a brewing grain 
following the Black Death.65 Wheat elasticities were understandably lower because 
wheat was the primary winter-sown grain, which meant that in the absence of other 
winter sown grains, a substantial change in the acreage planted with wheat would 
require altering existing crop rotations. However, in aggregate the price elasticities 
were low if not insignificant or negative; reeves were not price responsive when 
making planting decisions. 
  
                                                
63 Campbell, English, 243-5. 
64 Campbell, English, 245-7. 
65 Campbell, English, 243-5. 
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Table 3: Summary of price elasticities of supply on 49 Winchester manors, 1349-70 
Manor Name Wheat Elasticities Barley Elasticities Oat Elasticities
Adderbury 0 0
Alresford 0 0 0
Ashmansworth + 0 –
Beauworth – 0 0
Bentley 0 – 0
Bishop`s Stoke 0 0 0
Bishop`s Waltham 0 – –
Bitterne 0 + 0
Brightwell 0 0 0
Brockhampton + 0 0
Burghclere 0 0 –
Cheriton 0 0 +
Crawley 0 0 0
Culham 0 + +
Downton 0 0 –
Droxford 0 0 –
East Meon 0 0 0
East Meon Church – 0 0
Eblesbourne (Bishopstone) 0 0 0
Ecchinswell – 0 –
Fareham 0 – +
Farnham – + 0
Fonthill – + 0
Hambledon – 0 0
Harwell 0 0 +
High Clere – 0 –
Ivinghoe 0 + 0
Knoyle 0 0 0
Mardon 0 + 0
Marwell 0 0 0
Morton 0 0
North Waltham 0 + –
Overton – 0 –
Rimpton 0 0 0
Sutton 0 + 0
Taunton Holway 0 0
Taunton Hull 0 0
Taunton Nailsbourne 0 0
Taunton Poundisford 0 +
Taunton Staplegrove 0 0
Twyford 0 + –
Upton + – –
Waltham St Lawrence 0 0 0
Wargrave 0 0 0
West Wycombe + 0 0
Wield – 0 0
Witney 0 0 0
Wolvesey 0 0
Woodhay + 0 –  
Notes: + denotes at least one positive and significant price elasticity of supply; – denotes at least one 
negative and significant price elasticity of supply; 0 denotes no statistically significant price elasticities 
of supply; manors without a symbol did not produce that type of grain. 
Sources: see text. 
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IV 
After presenting aggregate and manor-level price elasticities of supply for the 
acreage sown with wheat, barley, and oats, we can now place this responsiveness in 
its long-term historical context by comparing it with other countries in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Comparing supply response across countries and centuries is 
complicated. Because prior studies of price responsiveness used the total acreage 
planted with a certain crop in a region, only the price elasticities of supply estimated 
as a panel are comparable with the later price elasticities, and even these regressions 
are not completely similar because the panel better accounts for variation on 
individual manors than the regional aggregate data for later periods.66 
Table 4: Comparison of medieval price elasticities of supply with price elasticities of 
supply calculated for other periods and countries. 
Crop
Short-run Price 
Elasticities Period Place Source
Wheat insig 1325-48 Southern England author
-.066 1349-70 Southern England author
0.09 Late 19th c. Hungary (Eddie, 1971)
0.42 Late 19th c. Germany (Eddie, 1971)
0.0278 Late 19th c. Missouri, USA (Fisher and Temin, 1970)
0.3053 Late 19th c. Wisconsin, USA (Fisher and Temin, 1970)
0.00 - 0.08 Early 20th c. Punjab (Krishna, 1963)
Barley -0.043 1325-48 Southern England author
0.04 1349-70 Southern England author
0.19 Late 19th c. Hungary (Eddie, 1971)
0.27 Late 19th c. Germany (Eddie, 1971)
0.39 Early 20th c. Punjab (Krishna, 1963)
Oats .091 1325-48 Southern England author
insig 1349-70 Southern England author
0.11 Late 19th c. Hungary (Eddie, 1971)
0.05 Late 19th c. Germany (Eddie, 1971)  
 
The short-run price elasticities of wheat supply in the aggregate Winchester 
panel were either not significantly different than zero or significantly negative. These 
are far below elasticities found in later periods (Table 4). Fisher and Temin found that 
the short-run price elasticity of supply for wheat in the United States in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was between 0.0278 in Missouri and 0.3053 
in Wisconsin.67 Krishna found short-run price elasticities of wheat supply in early 
twentieth century Punjab to be between zero and 0.08 depending on the irrigation 
method employed, while Eddie found short-run price elasticities of wheat supply to 
be 0.09 in Hungary and 0.42 in Germany in the late nineteenth century.68 Therefore, it 
                                                
66 Rao, ‘Agricultural’, 3. 
67 Fisher and Temin, ‘Regional’, 142-43; Askari and Cummings, Agricultural, 131-6. 
68 Krishna, ‘Farm’, 485; Eddie, ‘Farmers’, 576; Askari and Cummings, Agricultural, 392-93. 
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appears that price elasticities of wheat supply were lower in medieval England than 
they were in the less-developed parts of Europe such as Hungary in the late nineteenth 
century, and the gap increased when compared to the more technologically advanced 
countries like Germany. 
Price elasticities for barley and oats were available for fewer modern 
countries. The short-run price elasticities of barley supply on the Winchester manors 
before the Black Death were negative, but after the Black Death, the elasticity was 
positive and significant at an average of 0.04. Oats elasticities were significantly 
positive before the Black Death at 0.091 but not significantly different than zero 
thereafter. These elasticities were somewhat lower than elasticities in Hungary, 
Punjab, and Argentina in later periods. Eddie estimated short-run price elasticities of 
barley and oats supply to be 0.19 and 0.11 respectively in late-nineteenth-century 
Hungary and 0.27 and 0.05 respectively in Germany.69 Krishna observed a short-run 
price elasticity of 0.39 for barley in Punjab before World War II.70 Finally, Reca 
found the short-run price elasticity of oats supply to be 0.08 in Argentina before 
World War II.71 Thus, although the barley elasticities were statistically significant and 
positive, they were still considerably lower than price elasticities of supply in both the 
modern and less developed parts of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Oats elasticities seem to have been fairly low throughout time, but the 
medieval English elasticities were at about the same level. These comparisons with 
price responsiveness in other periods and countries suggest that reeves were not 
particularly responsive in medieval England and that there was an increase in price 
responsiveness between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, which could have 




As seen above, select Winchester manors were responding to changing 
economic conditions when making their planting decisions, but why reeves on some 
manors were responsive and others were not is still puzzling. This puzzle can be 
tested using regression analysis with the price elasticities of supply estimated for each 
manor serving as the dependent variable and seven important contributors to price 
responsiveness serving as the independent variables. Again, these elasticities were 
only estimated for the post-Black Death period (1349-70) when all 49 manors could 
be included in the regression so that the sample size would be large enough to 
produce robust results. Four price elasticities of supply were input into the regressions 
for each grain regardless of statistical significance, one for each price type described 
above (price, price relative to substitute grain, and price relative to wage) and another 
for the mean of the previous three elasticities. Logistic regressions were also 
attempted assigning one to manors with positive significant price elasticities and zero 
to all other manors, but these regressions were not robust or particularly helpful in 
displaying the relationships, so I have excluded them from the paper.  
                                                
69 Eddie, ‘Farmers’, 576; Askari and Cummings, Agricultural, 394-95. 
70 Krishna, ‘Farm’, 485. 
71 Schuh and Brandão, ‘Theory’, 662. 
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The first independent variable included in the regression was the coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of each grain’s yield per seed over 
the period. Askari and Cummings found that when yield coefficients of variation were 
larger, it was more difficult for farmers to make useful predictions about the future, 
and they were less likely to be price responsive.72  Second, the average percentage of 
arable land sown with the grain over the period 1349-70 served as a measure of the 
importance of a crop on the manor. This variable was excluded for wheat because it 
was highly correlated with another important variable, the percentage of the winter 
field sown with rye or mixed grains such as bere and maslin. When rye and mixed 
grains were planted in the winter field, the wheat acreage could be expanded or 
contracted at the expense of these other grains within existing rotations rather than the 
acreage planted with wheat being determined by the size of the winter field. Thus, 
manors planting higher percentages of the winter field with rye and mixed grains 
should have had more flexibility to be price responsive. Third, the number of fields 
planted on the manor tested whether having more fields allowed more flexibility in 
crop rotation.73 
Fourth, the average percentage of the year that Bishop Eddington spent at each 
manor during his episcopate (1345-1366) was included as a measure of the bishop’s 
influence on production and the requirements of the manor to provide for the bishop’s 
household. This variable was calculated from Bishop Eddington’s register, where the 
bishop’s location when making decrees and conducting business was recorded.74 In 
addition, the distance to the closest manor house, palace, or castle held by the bishop 
of Winchester was also included since manors in close proximity to the bishop also 
had to provide for his household.75 Sixth, the number of markets in a 16 km radius of 
the manor measures the influence of market density on price responsiveness.76 16 km 
is consistent with the normal marketing range for two manors in Wiltshire.77 Finally, 
a dummy variable was included to represent London’s economic sphere where 
manors within London’s trading zone were set equal to unity and all other manors 
were given a zero.78 Only these seven important variables were included in the 
regressions because the sample sizes were too small to support a great number of 
variables. 
The regressions were estimated for the price elasticity of each price type and 
each crop separately using OLS methods. These regressions are tentative estimations 
                                                
72 Askari and Cummings, Agricultural, 394-95. 
73 Both the number of fields variable and the percentage of the winter field sown with rye and mixed 
grains are the average for the years 1362-4 when these variables were recorded by Farmer. 
University of Saskatchewan Archives, The Papers of David Farmer, Series III, Box 10, Folder 10 
part 1. 
74 Register, xxiii-xxvi. Other measures of the time spent by the bishop on the manors were also input 
into the regressions with similar results. 
75 Map, Wolvesey Castle, Winchester. 
76 Keene and Letters, Markets and Fairs. A large number of market density measures were tried such 
as manors within a 10, 16, and 25 km radius of the manor. These values did not lead to 
significantly different relationships. 
77 Farmer, ‘Two’, 6; Farmer, ‘Marketing’, 360-4. 
78 Campbell, et al., Medieval Capital. 
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of the relationships at best because of the low sample sizes used to predict the price 
elasticities on each manor, but they provide a first look at the kinds of factors that 
might have been driving price responsiveness in southern England after the Black 
Death. 
For price elasticities of wheat supply (Table 5), manors that sowed a larger 
percentage of the winter field with rye or other mixed grains had consistently and 
significantly higher price elasticities of supply. Therefore, when the acreage planted 
with wheat could be adjusted within existing rotations by expanding or contracting 
the acreage planted with rye and other mixtures, reeves were more likely to be price 
responsive. The other variables did not have a significant effect on price elasticities. 
Therefore, local or regional markets did not seem to strongly influence price 
responsiveness for wheat. Again, these regressions are tentative because of the small 
sample size in estimating the individual manor price elasticities of supply and because 
the R-squares are low varying between 0.23 and 0.34. 
Table 5: Regressions explaining the variation in estimated price elasticities of wheat 
supply on 49 manors held by the bishop of Winchester, 1349-70. 
Price Elasticity of Acreage Planted Dep 1 2 3 4
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Heteroskedasticity Robust Robust Robust Robust
Grain Type Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
Price Type Grain Relative Grain Grain Wage Mean Elasticity
N 48 48 48 48
Constant -0.047 0.129 -0.030 0.017
(-0.37) (1.15) (-0.27) (0.17)
Coefficient of Variation of Wheat Yield -0.396 -0.780* -0.242 -0.473
(-0.95) (-1.84) (-0.71) (-1.36)
% of Winter Field Sown with Rye or Mixed Grains 0.341** 0.279* 0.452*** 0.358***
(2.69) (1.88) (3.29) (3.28)
Number of Fields 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.22) (-0.22) (0.75) (0.22)
Days per Year Manor Visited by Bishop Eddington -4.002 0.238 -3.726 -2.497
(-1.00) (0.08) (-1.08) (-0.80)
Distance to Manor House 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.44) (0.35) (-0.27) (0.25)
Markets in 16km Radius 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003
(1.39) (0.99) (0.60) (1.33)
Access to London Market -0.022 0.090 -0.039 0.010
(-0.28) (0.81) (-0.57) (0.15)
R-square 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.37
F-statistic 4.71 4.20 3.36 4.63  
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses: * denotes significance on the 10 per 
cent level; ** denotes significance on the 5 per cent level; *** denotes significance on the 1 per cent 
level. 
Sources: see text. 
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When estimating the regression for the price elasticities of barley supply, none 
of the coefficients were statistically significant (Table 6). This is puzzling because 
barley was the most price responsive of the three grains in aggregate and also had the 
most manors with positive price elasticities. The regression was slightly more 
powerful in predicting the variation in price elasticities of oats yields (Table 7), but 
many of the coefficients were only significant at the 10 per cent level and were only 
significant in one or two of the regressions, limiting their interpretive strength. The 
most robust variable was the market saturation variable. The number of markets in a 
16 km radius had a positive effect on the price elasticity of oats supply, suggesting 
that market saturation could also influence price elasticities of oats despite the fact 
that oats were marketed less frequently than wheat and barley.79 
Table 6: Regressions explaining the variation in estimated price elasticities of barley 
supply on 49 manors held by the bishop of Winchester, 1349-70. 
Price Elasticity of Acreage Planted Dep 1 2 3 4
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Heteroskedasticity Robust Robust Robust Robust
Grain Type Barley Barley Barley Barley
Price Type Grain Relative Grain Grain Wage Mean Elasticity
N 41 41 41 41
Constant -0.348 0.099 0.354 0.035
(-0.58) (0.22) (0.84) (0.12)
Coefficient of Variation of Barley Yield -0.109 0.889 -0.119 0.220
(-0.15) (1.02) (-0.19) (0.40)
Percentage of Arable Sown with Barley 1.270 -0.295 -0.173 0.268
(1.34) (-0.49) (-0.27) (0.66)
Number of Fields 0.013 -0.026 0.005 -0.003
(1.23) (-1.08) (0.45) (-0.23)
Days per Year Manor Visited by Bishop Eddington -0.695 8.158 -0.218 2.415
(-0.08) (0.96) (-0.02) (0.38)
Distance to Manor House -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.001
(-0.27) (1.00) (-0.44) (0.49)
Markets in 16km Radius -0.001 -0.007 -0.020 -0.009
(-0.04) (-0.47) (-1.54) (-1.09)
Access to London Market -0.028 0.034 -0.163 -0.052
(-0.19) (0.15) (-1.24) (-0.55)
R-square 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.12
F-statistic 2.37 0.77 2.50 1.07  
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses: * denotes significance on the 10 per 
cent level; ** denotes significance on the 5 per cent level; *** denotes significance on the 1 per cent 
level. 
Sources: see text. 
 
                                                
79 Campbell, ‘Measuring’, 157. 
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In conclusion, it is difficult to explain why some manors had higher price 
elasticities of supply than others. The concentration of markets around each manor 
had a positive effect on the price elasticity of oats supply, but this effect was not 
significant in explaining variations in price elasticities of wheat and barley supply. 
However, the existence of more than one crop in both the spring and winter fields 
significantly increased the reeve’s production flexibility and was also correlated with 
higher elasticities of wheat supply. This may suggest that more sophisticated rotations 
that utilized a wider variety of crops may have increased the production flexibility of 
the reeve.80 Despite these few significant variables, the regressions explaining the 
spatial variation in price elasticities had relatively low explanatory power with r-
squares ranging from 0.12 to 0.51. The difficulty in explaining the spatial variation in 
price elasticities is puzzling and perhaps corroborates Stone’s finding that some 
reeves were good managers and others were not.81 
Table 7: Regressions explaining the variation in estimated price elasticities of oat 
supply on 49 manors held by the bishop of Winchester, 1349-70. 
Price Elasticity of Acreage Planted Dep 1 2 3 4
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Heteroskedasticity Robust Robust Robust Robust
Grain Type Oats Oats Oats Oats
Price Type Grain Relative Grain Grain Wage Mean Elasticity
N 47 45 47 47
Constant -0.561 -0.237 -0.626 -0.465
(-1.68) (-0.81) (-1.59) (-1.49)
Coefficient of Variation of Oat Yield 2.113* 0.326 2.826* 1.734
(1.87) (0.48) (1.90) (1.62)
Percentage of Arable Sown with Oats -0.721 -0.902 -0.957 -0.884
(-1.17) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-1.47)
Number of Fields -0.000 0.009 -0.004 0.003
(-0.01) (0.68) (-0.19) (0.17)
Days per Year Manor Visited by Bishop Eddington -2.099 10.541 -5.383 0.915
(-0.17) (0.76) (-0.45) (0.07)
Distance to Manor House -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006*
(-1.77) (-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.71)
Markets in 16km Radius 0.008 0.020*** 0.005 0.011*
(1.22) (2.82) (0.66) (1.77)
Access to London Market 0.351* 0.242 0.279 0.290
(1.72) (0.89) (1.20) (1.36)
R-square 0.47 0.24 0.51 0.42
F-statistic 1.81 2.14 1.27 1.76  
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses: * denotes significance on the 10 per 
cent level; ** denotes significance on the 5 per cent level; *** denotes significance on the 1 per cent 
level. 
Sources: see text. 
                                                
80 Campbell, English, 291-301. 
81 Stone, Decision-Making, 205-12. 
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VI 
Stone’s more qualitative findings of price responsiveness on select manors 
throughout southern England in the late Middle Ages are corroborated by the minority 
of manors held by the bishop of Winchester that were significantly price responsive in 
their planting decisions. In fact, as he suggests different manors were price responsive 
in different ways (Table 3).82 In the end, however, aggregate price elasticities of 
supply were very low if they were significantly different than zero. Reeves on the 
Winchester estate did not adjust the acreage sown with various crops based on prices. 
These claims must be weakened slightly when extending them to the rest of England 
because the Winchester sample was not representative of England as a whole. If 
manors from the more developed eastern regions such as East Anglia and Kent were 
included in the sample, supply response might be marginally higher. However, even 
considering the seigniorial sector as a whole, it seems unlikely that reeves would have 
been price responsive relative to later time periods. 
Projecting this inference from the seigniorial sector to the agricultural sector 
as a whole is more difficult because very little is understood about supply response in 
peasant agriculture. As mentioned above, Dodds found some evidence that peasants 
were price responsive, but Sapoznik found the opposite when looking at good tithe 
data at the local level.83 Hypothetically, the addition of the peasant sector could 
increase or decrease overall price responsiveness in the agricultural sector. It is 
possible that because peasants often farmed small strips of land in larger common 
fields, they had less production flexibility than the seigniorial sector and thus were 
even less price-responsive than reeves managing demesnes. On the other hand, if 
peasants held land in closes where they had considerable control over their 
production, they may have been more price responsive than reeves managing 
demesnes. If forced to speculate, I would suggest a pessimistic view of peasant price 
responsiveness for several reasons. First, the traditional risk-aversion of subsistence 
farmers should not be underestimated. Second, even when peasants had considerable 
control over their own land, it would have been very difficult for them to abruptly 
switch from one crop to another because they would have had to purchase seed at 
considerable cost. Third, as Sapoznik has argued, peasants may have been forced to 
devote a larger proportion of their production to non-market fodder crops than the 
seigniorial sector because peasants did not have the same access to pasture and 
grassland.84 Finally, because peasants fed their families from their fields, a smaller 
proportion of their total output was marketed. Thus, although the peasant sector may 
have produced two-thirds to four-fifths of agricultural output, the peasant share of 
total marketed output was likely substantially lower than their share of total output.85 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to tentatively assume that price responsiveness was 
low across the agricultural sector of medieval England. 
Low price elasticities of supply in agriculture should not be dismissed as a 
narrow measure of commercialization in the economy for several reasons. Low 
                                                
82 Stone, Decision-Making, 205-12. 
83 Dodds, Peasants, 161; Sapoznik, ‘Productivity’, 18. 
84 Sapoznik, ‘Productivity’, 23. 
85 Dodds, ‘Demesne’, 124. 
 22 
agricultural supply response would have negatively affected living standards by 
prolonging and accentuating periods of famine and dearth. If reeves and peasants 
were not price responsive, then they would not have expanded their grain production 
when prices were higher. Thus, it would have taken longer for supply shortfalls to be 
overcome. Low supply response also contributed to higher price variation for similar 
reasons, making it more difficult for farmers to predict price conditions in the future. 
Finally, low supply response meant that changes in prices were unlikely to drive 
changes in grain output or the efficiency of production on manors. For instance, a 
sharp, sustained rise in the wheat price relative to the oats price would not necessarily 
lead to an increase in wheat production relative to oats production. Therefore, 
structural changes in the economy such as the disappearance of villeinage, the leasing 
of manors, and the growth of the wage labour market later in the fourteenth century 
may have been more important drivers of economic change in the post-Black Death 
period than prices. 
From a long-run perspective, the evidence presented here challenges the 
assumption held by economists that farmers have always been price responsive.86 
This could affect the long-run development literature in two ways. First, a shift from 
low supply response to higher supply response could have been an important part of 
the capitalist transformation of English agriculture in the early modern and modern 
periods, and thus, might explain differing development trajectories across Europe. 
Second, low price responsiveness in medieval agriculture poses methodological 
problems for the market integration literature. Economists have measured market 
integration using the price volatility of grain prices at specific locations. They assume 
that if markets were more integrated, price volatility would be lower because high 
prices would be mediated by grain transported in from regions with a surplus.87 
However, as mentioned above, price volatility would also be influenced by whether or 
not producers were price responsive. Thus, if farmers became more price responsive 
over the early modern period, grain price volatility would decline in the absence of 
greater market integration. 
Insignificant or low price elasticities of supply in medieval England suggest 
that reeves on the Winchester estates were not strictly behaving according to 
neoclassical economic principles, but determining why their behaviour differed is 
more difficult. One possible explanation would be that reeves simply were 
economically irrational. Although commercialization had increased over twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, Postan’s dictum that medieval farmers could not be expected ‘to 
sow more or to work harder in response to the stimuli of prices or under the influence 
of a pessimistic or optimistic view of future business prospects’ was largely true.88  
Another possible explanation for low or insignificant price elasticities of 
supply would be that the agricultural technology of the period limited reeves’ 
flexibility to adjust their output from existing crop rotations year-to-year. The threat 
of declining soil fertility forced reeves to maintain strict two- or three-field rotations 
with regular fallows and prevented them from expanding the acreage planted with a 
certain crop in response to price changes. Thus, it was only with the invention of 
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more complex crop rotations beginning with the ‘Norfolk System’ in the late 
medieval period and continuing during the early modern Agricultural Revolution that 
farmers gained the ability to vary their output in response to prices.89  
Manorial customs and institutions could have also misaligned reeves’ 
incentives making it against their interest to be price responsive. It certainly did not 
help that reeves received no financial incentives for profit maximizing behaviour and 
that the estates did not seem to measure profit in a useful way.90 However, the reeves 
incentives could be misaligned in other ways. For instance, on the bishop’s manor of 
Taunton customary tenants could be required to purchase grain from the estate at rates 
slightly above market prices. These purchases made up 28 per cent of wheat sales and 
86 per cent of oats sales from 1283 to 1348. Thus, if the reeve expanded wheat 
production with higher prices, he and his fellow customary tenants might be forced to 
purchase more grain at higher prices whether they needed the grain or not. This 
custom clearly disrupted normal links between production, demand and prices.91 
Likewise, production decisions could have also been primarily driven by the lord’s 
consumption requirements rather than by profit maximizing calculations. This would 
have been especially true for lords with smaller estates than the bishop of Winchester, 
who could not possibly have consumed the majority of the output of their estates. 
A final possibility is that prices were so volatile in medieval England that it 
did not make sense to try to predict future price movements.92 Past price movements 
were completely disconnected from future price movements because exogenous 
weather variation had such a strong influence on grain output and prices. Thus, it was 
only with improving agricultural technology, decreasing weather volatility, and 
increasing market integration that prices became stable enough for farmers to adjust 
the acreage planted with crops in accordance to prices. 
Distinguishing between these four possible explanations of low supply 
response in the medieval period will require further research. Unfortunately, detailed 
information on farm production like that available in medieval manorial accounts 
does not exist for the early modern period, so it will be difficult to extend the current 
methodology. However, the same methodology could be applied to manors in the 
more advanced regions of England such as East Anglia in the medieval period to see 
whether the more complex and intensive cropping systems employed there increased 
reeves’ flexibility to adjust their production year-to-year. The importance of the 
bishop’s consumption could be tested more rigorously in two ways: first, by 
attempting to understand what factors affected the amount of grain transferred to the 
lord from each manor and second, by testing whether variables related to the lord’s 
consumption such as distance to a manor house or the average time spent at a manor 
affected the acreage planted with certain grains. This kind of analysis would help 
resolve lingering doubts about the roles of central estate planners versus semi-
autonomous reeves. Reeves’ rationality can also be tested in other spheres where 
technology was perhaps less of a limitation. For instance, did reeves sell a higher 
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proportion of their output when the price was higher or horde their grain in times of 
dearth? New economic models and robust econometric techniques will be required to 
test these new hypotheses, but they will be necessary in order to determine the full 
extent of commercialization in the medieval economy. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this paper does not refute the wave of 
commercialization that other authors have discovered in the two centuries before the 
Black Death, nor does it prove that the medieval English economy was a natural 
economy in the way that Postan argued.93 Instead, it suggests that despite the 
increased urbanization, monetization, and marketization, there were real limitations in 
the commercial development of the economy. 
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Appendix I: Partial Adjustment Model of Supply Response 
This paper tests the acreage supply response of reeves in a partial adjustment 
model framework. The partial adjustment model is made up of two structural 
equations. First, the equilibrium (desired) acreage planted is taken to be a function of 
expected prices 
  (1) 
where  is the equilibrium acreage planted at time t and  is the expected price in 
the current year. Essentially, the equation states that reeves planted their fields based 
on the grain price that they expected for the succeeding year. For the sake of 
simplicity in estimation, expected prices are taken to be the price in the previous year.  
  (2) 
The second structural equation holds that the actual change in acreage planted from 
one period to the next is proportional to the difference between the equilibrium 
(desired) acreage planted and the acreage planted in the last period 
  (3) 
where  is the acreage planted in year t and ! is the speed of adjustment from one 
year to the next. This equation allows for various constraints that might prevent 
farmers from adjusting their production to the equilibrium (desired) acreage every 
year. If ! is equal to unity, then the farmers are adjusting to the equilibrium level 
every year: i.e. they are actually planting the desired equilibrium acreage. However, if 
! is less than unity, then farmers took more than one year to adjust to the equilibrium 
(desired) acreage. When equation 1 is substituted into equation 3 to remove the 
unknown equilibrium acreage planted, the following equation is obtained 
  (4) 
Thus, the acreage planted is a function of the lagged price and the acreage planted in 
the previous year.94 
The expected price in this model is taken to be the price in the previous year. 
This simplification is common in agricultural supply response literature and was 
necessary because including a price expectation other than the price in the previous 
year makes the model unidentifiable.95 The short-run elasticity, the response of 
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However, in order to combine the partial adjustment and adaptive expectations models, either the 
coefficient of adjustment, !, in the partial adjustment model or the coefficient of expectation, ", in 
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acreage to price in one year, is the coefficient on the lagged price in equation 4 (b!) 
when both the acreage sown and the prices are logged. The long-run elasticity ‘is 
defined as the elasticity over the time period necessary for complete adaptation’, and 
when acreages sown and prices are logged, it is equal to b in equation 4.96 
In order to estimate price elasticities of supply that would be comparable with 
the aggregate estimations available for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
equation 3 was first estimated using each panel. Fixed-effects regressions were not 
possible because there was serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors for all models, 
so Generalized Least Squares regressions were employed. Acreages planted were 
standardized based on the mean acreage planted with each crop over the period so that 
the indexed value was the percentage change from the mean from year to year. 
In order to pinpoint which manors were price responsive and which were not, 
standard time series OLS regressions were used to estimate equation 4 on each 
individual manor. Because some of the series were stationary and others were not, 
first differences of the acreage sown, lagged acreage sown and lagged price variables 
were used in all regressions. The regressions were also checked for serial correlation, 
and where serial correlation was present, Prais-Winsten regressions were used to 
correct the parameters and standard errors.97 
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